ABSTRACT Connected vehicles continuously reveal their location information to the potential observers that then track vehicles over time and space. However, safety applications require disseminating such location information to the vicinity, which essentially urges to develop the awareness ability of the exposed location-privacy quantity. We propose an analytic framework to quantify location privacy from the perspective of temporal and spatial correlation, which permits connected vehicles to flexibly configure their preferential location-privacy sensitivity extent. We offer a novel approach so as to make the disclosure of location privacy more human-understandable and independent of the suffered attack pattern. This paradigm enables users to customize the location-privacy protection mechanisms for adapting to the frequently varying traffic context. Moreover, we put forward an adaptive lived-term pseudonym scheme for exampling how to utilize the presented quantitative framework. Finally, we move from theory to practice by applying the proposed theoretical framework to a simulation vehicular mobility data set TAPASCologne composed of more than two hundred and fifty thousand vehicles and a real trace set of more than ten million location sample points obtained from the Roman taxis. We investigate the accuracy and applicability of the presented quantification model and effects of combinations of various concerned parameters. The results show that the quantification model can identify the real-time exposure of location privacy efficiently and effectively as vehicles move and then provide quantitative control feedback to privacy protection mechanisms, which facilitates restrict the location privacy to a target value and tradeoff between the location privacy and service enjoyment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, lots of research efforts have been devoted to vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET), ranging from communication and networking challenges to lightweight security protection. As VANET becomes the norm, the problem of location privacy attracts ever-increasing attention. Users can accept the exposure of location privacy for a short period. But the exposure of a huge amount of location privacy will lead to serious consequences, for example observers can inspect all historical tracks of users. Most previous work [1] - [4] focuses on the protection mechanisms, however, the location privacy quantification problem is still quite open. Privacy quantification is prerequisite for adaptive privacy protection. Some location-privacy protection mechanisms (LPPMs) are already available, but they lack of an objective metric to rank them and quantificationally measure their protection utilities. This paper concentrates on human-understandable quantification of location privacy over time.
There are two motivations for this paper. One is a well-defined metric of location privacy and the other is a quantitative measurement for location privacy protection. With technological advancement, numerous safety and entertainment applications are introduced into VANET. The inherent properties of most of them depend on the location-based services and sensing of the surrounding peers in order to collaborate with each other. There are several compelling reasons for users to reveal their locations. The relative success of some location-based applications implies that at least some users agree to disseminate their location information to third parties. For example, vehicles advertise their presence by periodically broadcasting proximity beacons every 50 ms over a range of 300 m. Mobile vehicles produce and consume a great amount of contents with the local spatio-temporal relevance. The ubiquitous observers could figure out vehicles' profiles and traces in real time using such relevance. To defend against the unauthorized eavesdropping, various LPPMs are proposed to attain a conditional privacy conservation. Some goals are clearly mutually exclusive and cannot be simultaneously satisfied, e.g., keeping users' positions secret and meanwhile enjoying location information for useful services. An ideal LPPM needs to be capable of behaving adaptively to the frequently varying context regarding the characteristics of VANET. To this end, one well-defined metric of location privacy is prerequisite to be timely aware of the remaining quantity of location privacy, which is a main motivation of this work.
Location is an important attribute of the vehicle, so a quantitative measurement for location privacy protection is necessary. Since vehicular applications generally require an authentication feature to verify the identity of communicating peers, each vehicle is preloaded with an asymmetric key pair and all messages are signed and usually sent along with the public key [5] . However, observers can monitor public keys to learn the vehicles' locations. So a bundle of anonymous certificates is usually preloaded into vehicles by an off-line certification authority (CA). Therefrom, vehicles decide whether to change their pseudonym based on a fixed updating period or comparing the current privacy level to a threshold value. There are also several other approaches besides the multiple pseudonyms to protect location privacy. Group signature [6] enables a group member to sign on behalf of a group with a central coordinator without revealing the signer's identity. Ring signature [7] permits signing on behalf of an ad hoc group without a central coordinator. Anonymous credential system [8] allows mobile nodes to anonymously authenticate to third parties by an online credential issuer. Therefore, a quantitative measurement for location privacy protection is quite important and will help assess the privacy provided by the existing schemes, which is another motivation of this paper.
Temporal and spatial attributes are important to location privacy quantification in VANET. The spatial attribute is the inherent property of location privacy. However, it will greatly reduce its effect if location privacy lacks the temporal attribute. For example, an observer cannot trace the entire travel trajectory through location information without temporal attribute, and cannot conjecture the location of the user in a certain period of time in the future. In addition, due to the high-speed characteristic of the vehicle, the location information in VANET is strongly time limited. For example, BSM (basic safety message, including current time, location, speed, vehicle state, etc.) is defined in T/CSAE 53-2017 [9] and SAE J2735 [10] separately, and the vehicle inform its real-time status to others by broadcasting a BSM in order to support safety applications. Therefore, location privacy quantification must include temporal and spatial information.
At present, there have been many papers on the metric of location privacy and its quantitative measurement for protection. But unlike others' opinions, we found that the exposure of location privacy from the users' view is worse through experiments, so we have chosen a novel perspective that is users' privacy preferences should be customized and the metric of location privacy should be human-understandable.
Most previous literature [11] - [13] quantify location privacy mainly from the viewpoint of the attacker rather than the user. Probably they argue the two cases seem to be just one case saying from different points of view. However, we discover both cases are of quite difference for each side. Quantified values of exposure of location privacy from the viewpoint of a user absolutely differs from those of an observer. For example, two observers will get two different quantified values by different eavesdropping and/or location analytical methods. However, quantified values from the user's viewpoint can't be calculated by the two different quantified values from observers, because we don't know the relationship between them. Our results indeed show that the exposure of location privacy from the users' view is worse than from the observers' perspective except in the extreme case where the probes are everywhere available so the quantified values of location privacy by both are identical.
Furthermore, the employed attack method by the observers is transparent to the target users in practice, so the users are unable to autonomously quantify location privacy according to the suffered attack type from their own viewpoints, and thus LPPMs fail to behave adaptively against the elapsed location privacy. The location privacy could be viewed as a user's inherent property that is correlated with the user's subjective behaviors and preferences. A reasonable quantification criterion should be user-centric. Various mobile users might display different sensitivities to the experienced disclosure of location privacy. Imagine again two mobile users with different sensitivities to the exposure of location privacy drive along the exactly same trajectory and are tracked by one given observer, so apparently leading to the same quantified values of location privacy from the observer's viewpoint, but diverse results from the two users' perspectives because of the different susceptibilities to location privacy protection. The location-privacy preferences are governed by a variety of factors, including both personal and contextual considerations [14] . The framework of quantifying location privacy should permit users to customize their own privacy profile and threshold.
Metrics for the location privacy of VANET have not reached the satisfactory maturity level. This is partly due to the nature of location-privacy exposure, in which the target user rather than the observer is exactly the protagonist. Location-privacy quantification is of high importance with respect that (i) human beings are notoriously bad at estimating the faced risks (surely including the risk of location privacy), (ii) it is the proper roadmap to perform meaningful comparisons between various LPPM candidates, and (iii) the current available literature in this topic is not yet mature enough. The adversary model is difficultly formalized to cover all the possible attacking cases, which unavoidably causes a wrong estimation of the location privacy of VANET. It is essential to provide a human-understandable expression of location privacy for facilitating the acceptance of conditional location privacy and adaptive defence control in VANET.
This paper examines an analytic framework of locationprivacy quantification that is expected to be commonly applied but not limited to VANET. Our main contributions could be summarized by
• (i) proposing a spatio-temporal privacy quantification paradigm by introducing Minkowski space to measure the leaking extent of location privacy during movement in real time,
• (ii) incorporating users' privacy preferences into the model through toning two parameters: the frequencies that users change their pseudonyms and the distances between two contiguous operations of pseudonym changing,
• (iii) presenting an adaptive lived-term pseudonym scheme for exampling how to utilize the presented quantitative framework of location privacy, and
• (iv) verifying the framework's validity into two mobility trace datasets, one simulated vehicular mobility dataset, TAPASCologne, and one real vehicle trace dataset, Roman taxi. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the recent work concerning location privacy protection and quantification studies. Section 3 introduces the theoretical framework of spatial-temporal location privacy quantification and adaptive lived-term pseudonym in detail, followed by the extensive results in Section 4. Finally, some conclusions are drawn and the future work is given in Section 5.
II. RELATED WORK
Location privacy is one of the main challenges in VANET, which aims to protect mobile vehicles from being tracked. Most the LPPMs focus on altering pseudonyms efficiently for avoiding linking messages among them. However, the sensitive and invariable information in the periodical beacons cause them vulnerable to being tracked even though the beacons are totally anonymous. Beresford and Stanjano [15] defined location privacy as "... the ability to prevent other parties from learning one's current or past location". Some attacking ways are available to track mobile nodes through information underlying the anonymous beacons, e.g. the nearest neighbor probabilistic data association (NNPDA) [16] . Prior improvements regarding privacy protection achieved through pseudonyms have become negligible due to GPS and cellular enabled traceability [17] . Even if location traces of mobile nodes do not contain any pseudonyms, Hoh and Gruteser [18] were able to reconstruct the tracks of mobile nodes using a multiple target tracking algorithm. So the spatial and temporal correlation between successive locations of mobile nodes should be carefully eliminated to prevent observers from compromising their location privacy. To facilitate location-privacy protection, much effort should be made to timely quantifying how much the location privacy is already exposed to the hidden observers, by which the LPPMs could be designed and controlled on purpose.
Location-privacy protection aims to obscure one's trajectory and to develop system architectures for anonymizing individuals or minimizing information leakage for location-based services [19] . Messages should be signed and verified before being trusted while the real identity of mobile nodes should not be revealed, but traceable by the authorized party [20] , [21] . The concepts of virtual trip lines [22] , [23] that are geographic markers and dynamic mix zones [24] , [25] that are dynamically formed upon the mobile nodes' request are always adopted to avoid specific privacy sensitive locations. The LPPMs should be equipped with both a priori and a posteriori countermeasures. The threshold used for a priori endorsement can adaptively vary according to the experienced context rather than preset in the system design stage as in the existing schemes [26] . Innocuous data such as beaconing may give away location coordinates and timestamps that indicate an individual's movement over time and can easily lead to unpredictable repercussions. Location-privacy concerns are highly sensitive to contextual factors and subjective preferences. Location privacy game between user and adversary could be considered which could output the optimal obfuscation strategy and its corresponding optimal inference attack contributing to the optimal LPPM [27] . Location privacy can be seen as a continuum between confidentiality and disclosure [28] , used in such a way as to allow people to customize their own tolerance level against location-privacy exposure to their surroundings appropriately regarding the experienced situation and characterized habit.
Progress in computational location privacy depends on the ability to quantify location privacy. There is not yet a recognized standard available for this purpose, and it is rare for even two similar research projects to use the same method of quantification [29] . Since location can be exactly specified by a single coordinate, one natural way of quantifying location privacy is to assess how much an attacker might know about this coordinate. For instance, Hoh and Gruteser [30] quantify the location privacy as the anticipated error of distance between a user's true location and an adversary's estimated value. In Krumm's reverse white pages attacks [31] , the quantifier for privacy is defined as the number of names or home addresses that an attacker could find. In introducing k-anonymity for location privacy, Gruteser and Grunwald [32] use k to represent the level of privacy. Corser and Fu defines continuous network location privacy VOLUME 6, 2018 and presents KDT -anonymity which extends k-anonymity with average distance deviation D and anonymity duration T [33] . Entropy is the privacy quantifier used by Beresford and Stajano [15] . They show how an attacker could use behavioral probabilities to attach probabilities to the problem of linking changing pseudonymous over time. Shokri et al. [11] , [34] quantify user's location privacy by modeling the location-based applications, the LPPMs, and an adversary model.
In this paper, we propose an attacking-independent theoretical framework to modeling the disclosure process of the location privacy. We devote to providing an objective quantitative mechanism by which the users can be aware of how much the location privacy has been leaked in real time, and thus the employed LPPM is capable of behaving adaptively to this change actively from the users' viewpoint. To do that, we model the location privacy with a gamma function in the spatial-temporal domain. The value of the function represents the accuracy of the adversary's estimation about a user's location. We then give an adaptive lived-term pseudonym scheme for exampling how to utilize the proposed quantitative framework of location privacy. Finally, we apply the proposed framework to a simulation dataset TAPASCologne and a real Roma-taxi dataset to show that the proposed method can efficiently and effectively identity the real-time disclosure of location privacy as the mobile vehicle moves.
III. MODELS
In this section, we describe a system model explaining the protection strategy vehicles can use to hide location privacy and the attacking way observers can use to collect information that can be used to track vehicles, then explain the dynamics process of location privacy model, next propose a model to quantify the location privacy of a vehicle over time, and finally give adaptive lived-term pseudonym for exampling the practical application of the presented quantification framework of location privacy.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
In most location privacy literature, they usually assume a global adversary who can listen to all messages and tries to link them. The success of the adversary is measured by its capability to accomplish this goal. If pseudonym techniques and some smart pseudonym changing strategies are adopted, the attacker is unable to link all the small pieces but able to link some pieces. Compared with other multiple pseudonym approaches, dynamic mix zone is particularly appealing in VANET [5] because it does not require the help of the infrastructure nor prior knowledge of the location of mix zones. So we consider vehicles adopt dynamic mix zone strategy by which a vehicle broadcasts a pseudonym update request to its vicinity according to comparing the remaining location privacy quantity to the threshold. We assume that an adversary can track the location of mobile vehicles through deploying its own eavesdropping probers over the network.
In the worst case, the adversary collects complete coverage and tracks nodes throughout the entire network. The layout design of eavesdropping probers is invisible to the target vehicles, so vehicles have to prudently consider the worst case in quantifying location privacy, which is characterized as theoretical case in this work. Comparatively, the exposed location privacy quantity from the observer's viewpoint is so-called real case. An adversary collects identifying information-i.e. pseudonyms from the network and accordingly infers location traces. Hence, the problem we tackle in this paper consists in answering how much the location privacy of VANET is already leaked in real time.
B. DYNAMICS PROCESS
Location-based applications disclose rich location information about VANET. State-of-the-art communication architectures are aware of such problem and thus provide privacy enhancing technologies, notably pseudonymous authentication. However, the granularity and amount of the location information divulged by the applications enable an adversary, which can eavesdrop the traffic throughout a monitored area and collude with others in vicinities, to reconstruct long traces of the whereabouts of the majority of mobile users within a large-scale spatial and temporal range. Therefore, two key factors that affect the disclosure of location privacy are how long and how far the connected vehicles are tracked during movement, which need to be uniformly considered to quantify the location privacy. Every connected vehicle undoubtedly lives in a spatiotemporal network composed of a 3D plane and a time plane, as shown in Figure 1 where the three ordinary dimensions of space are combined with a single dimension of time to form a four-dimensional manifold for representing a spacetime, namely Minkowski space. The space-time interval between two events in Minkowski space is either space-like or timelike. As illustrated, the symbols r and R respectively indicate the communication radius of the mobile vehicle and the probe range of the observer, which together affect the dissemination distance of beacons and further proportionally activate the exposure tendency of location privacy.
Prior to formalize the quantification of location privacy, we should envision a rational dynamics process of the location-privacy exposure as connected vehicles move. Generally speaking, at the initial phase of eavesdropping, the unit amount p of the exposure quantity of location privacy should be quickly increased because each captured packet is new and valuable to the observer for the purpose of tracking, through which the observer could learn newer analytical locations than before. Subsequently, p begins to gradually increase until climbing up to a peak point at certain time that depends on the communication ranges r and R. This varying trend could be understood as successive quantitative accumulations are bound to trigger a qualitative change because of the gradual accumulation in the tracking process. Concretely speaking, every initially intercepted packet is quite meaningful to the observer who knows nothing at all about the target user at that time and could roughly figure out the whereabouts profile through the captured packets, which corresponds to the increasing unit amount p. Once eavesdropping enough packets, the observer could infer the remaining empty locations in spite of without monitoring the related packets yet through utilizing the map, historical trace, and experience, and thus this time instant corresponds to the peak value of p. So the subsequent captured packets contribute less implication than before although the location privacy still continues to be disclosed, which corresponds to the reduced unit amount p. In a nutshell, the unit amount p of the exposure quantity of location privacy should be a time-dependent variable. A harmonious theoretical framework for quantifying location privacy should allow the user ownself to customize the tolerable values of being tracked by the observers at the temporal and spatial aspects in accordance to the user's preferences, which are termed by T and D , respectively. The values of T and D reflect the extent to which the users are sensitive to the disclosure of location privacy. The bigger the values of T and D , the lower the sensitivity to a given exposure quantity of location privacy, i.e. p ∝ The users' sensitivity to the location privacy decides the exposure rate of location privacy while the communication ranges r and R of users and observers restrict the phase point of shifting to decreasing tendency.
Consider two different movement cases. A vehicle walks along a round non-stop back to the origin during a long time interval while the same vehicle spends a short time interval to move along a direct line. We could approximately estimate that the vehicle is tracked more at the temporal aspect in the former case than in the latter case if indiscriminate trajectory, but opposite with respect to the spatial aspect. It cannot easily affirm which case discloses more location privacy of the vehicle over another. The exposure of location privacy should be synthetically quantified from the spatio-temporal viewpoint. We recommend employing the Euclidean distance between the origin and current point rather than the travelled distance to measure the spatial exposure of location privacy, and the watch time at the temporal aspect. Surely, one also can adopt the travelled distance rather than the Euclidean distance to measure the spatial exposure of location privacy, which could be viewed as a way to distinguish the trajectory importance. Without losing the generality, the quantified value of location privacy could be regarded as a continuous quantity span from 0 to 1. This process utilizes a normalization approach [35] , [36] . Different quantification methods of location privacy often have different units, which will affect LPPMs. The quantified values could be in the same order of magnitude after normalization, which is conducive to mixed use or comparison. By definitions and common-sense reasoning, the remaining spatial location privacy P D and the remaining temporal location privacy P T should hold some intrinsic relations with the remaining entire location privacy P. 
which means the entire location privacy approaches the maximum value if the user extremely worries one-unit-time privacy exposure in spite of no limit to the spatial concern, i.e.
P(t, d) = 1, which is the similar to (iv), but from the spatial perspective. (vi) P(t, d) = F(P T (t), P D (d), R, r)
, which explains the quantified value of location privacy should be only related to the four factors, i.e. P T (t), P D (d), R, and r.
C. QUANTIFICATION MODEL
The practitioners could fully utilize the above relations among various factors and define the concrete form of F(P T (t), P D (d), R, r) for quantifying the location privacy according to the target scenario. Since the gamma distribution can be parameterized in terms of a shape parameter and a rate parameter, both of which easily satisfy the above requirements, we extend the gamma distribution to accommodate the focused correlations in connected vehicles, but it does not mean only gamma distribution is proper. The probability density function f (x; α, β) and cumulative distribution function F(x; α, β) of a classical gamma distribution are expressed by (1) and (2), and the corresponding curves are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3 .
where α is the shape parameter, which decides the required time to reach the peak value in the probability density function f , and the climbing speed to the peak value in the cumulative distribution function F. For the user, α determines the speed of location-privacy exposure and affects the trend of location privacy. β is the rate parameter, which determines the value of peak point in the probability density function, and VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 2. The probability density function of a classical gamma distribution. the time of arrival in the peak value. For the user, β affects the peak value of the unit amount of location-privacy exposure, at which point the observer obtains sufficient packets to infer the remaining empty locations. (α) is the gamma function evaluated at α. γ (α, x β ) is the lower incomplete gamma function. By definitions and the aforementioned analysis, the loss quantities of location privacy over one temporal unit f T (x) and one spatial unit f D (x) are respectively expressed by:
where T and D are the user's allowable maximum time interval and displacement length to be tracked by the observer, respectively, which meaningfully correspond to the sensitivity of temporal and spatial aspects, and shall be customized by the user. µ T and µ D are theoretically possible maximum time interval and displacement length to be tracked by the observer, respectively, which depend on the practical scenario and configuration of the observer. µ T = 1200s and µ D = 1000m in our simulations. R is the monitor range of the observer. Since the unit amounts f T (x) and f D (x) are time-dependent and space-dependent variables, the total amounts of loss quantity at the temporal and spatial aspects correspond to the integral of one-unit loss quantity over the observed time window t or distance length d, respectively. The observed interval duration is counted regarding the same pseudonym. Therefore, the remaining quantities of location privacy at the temporal P T (t) and spatial aspects P D (d) and the whole location privacy P(t, d) are calculated by:
where G(ρ) is a function that figures out the deployed density ρ of the observer's probes, which is expressed by:
Finally, we could obtain the complete expression of the whole location privacy through substituting (12) into (11), i.e.:
From (13), one can know that P(t, d) → 1 if ρ → 0, and P(t, d) → 0 if ρ = 1. The calculation of ρ is out of the scope of this paper due to the page limit, and more details about the coverage problem could be found in [37] . If a successful pseudonym update occurs in dynamic mix zone, the current vehicle's integral interval t and d will reset and again build. This implies we do not consider the possibility of linking trace from two successive pseudonyms or indirectly relying on vehicles' distinctive fingerprints at the physical and link layers.
IV. ADAPTIVE LIVED-TERM PSEUDONYM
VANET traditionally adopts the short lived-terms pseudonymous certificate against the leakage of location privacy, in which the vehicles run the reissuing process of the certificate based on the remaining number of pseudonymous certificate, and users can adjust the updating frequency of the short lived-terms certificate from the preloaded certificate pool and/or a remote CA. This method seems simple but is not practically cost-effective for the connected vehicles where the context is frequently varying and the resources are scarce, e.g. bandwidth. Moreover, a pseudonym change causes considerable networking performance overhead and suspended communication cost. The updating frequency matters to the applicability of the traditional method, because it seriously burdens the network resources if too fast, otherwise revealing too much location privacy, which could be viewed as a typical trade-off optimisation problem. Manually assigning a updating frequency is not a good idea because human beings are notoriously weak at estimating the faced risks and are not eligible optimisers. Moreover, a fixed updating frequency difficultly satisfies the requirement of various applications on the location privacy protection and hardly reacts to the constantly varying experienced context. So it is essential to design a technically guaranteed controller for the context-aware updating frequency. To the end, we put forward an adaptive lived-term pseudonym scheme and also for exampling how to utilize the presented quantitative framework of location privacy. One point to be noted is that the proposed location-privacy quantification framework is of multiple uses and not only for certificate update.
The short-termed pseudonym aims to cut off long-time identification on users' moving trace for protecting location privacy, so its time interval of validity should be quite short. Generally speaking, the validity time T certificate of the pseudonymous certificate is fixed once issued. In fact, the privacy is closely determined upon the capacity of users' tolerance against location privacy exposure, so a connected vehicle should have the ability that users can customize the rules of privacy against a variety of factors, including personal and contextual considerations. The capacity of users' tolerance is related with temporal and spatial variations together with the frequency of communications. The temporal variation refers to the time duration t from the last updating of pseudonym until the current instant, which defines the time period of being locked by an observer, even at the same location. The spatial variation refers to the Euclidean distance d from the location at which the last updating of pseudonym occurs to the current location, which specifies the distance of being tracked by an observer. In the worst case, an observer is able to collect all the packets through the ubiquitous probes throughout a city, so the disclosure of mobility trace is dependent on the frequency of communications. If no packet is sent during a time period, during which the location privacy is kept from eavesdroppers. Furthermore, updating pseudonymous certificate should adapt to the communication and mobility rather than a predefined rule. To this end, we could utilise the presented quantitative framework of location privacy to timely calculate the remaining location privacy quantity, and trigger a reissuing process of pseudonymous certificate upon the remaining value below the users' preferential threshold P . The proposed mechanism can be viewed as a variant of dynamic mix-zone but with a spatial-temporal-dependent payoff. Figure 4 shows the flow chart of adaptive lived-term pseudonym. First, the user sets T , D and P . T and D are the user's tolerable maximum values of being tracked by the observers at the temporal and spatial aspects. Then the mechanism will judge whether T and D approach the infinity which means P(t, d) ≡ 0. If the judgment is true, then we need to choose traditional pseudonymous certificate which will update according to the validity time T certificate . In this case, the user does not mind the leakage of location privacy at all. Therefore, we need some tips about the dangers of privacy exposure for user to minimize the occurrence of this case. If the judgment is false, we can calculate the remaining location privacy quantity P(t, d) and judge whether P(t, d) < P . If P(t, d) is less than the threshold P , the pseudonymous certificate will update. Otherwise, we need to wait for T wait and calculate P(t, d) again, which means the next time interval.
V. RESULTS
Strictly speaking, the perfect justification of Gamma distribution suitable for location privacy quantification is hardly conducted because of lacking of real location-privacy dataset and simulation toolkit except the mobility trace by far. So we are unable to fit the model output to the measured and simulation results of location-privacy system. Such verification test is actually a conflict because location privacy means the overall acceptability perceived subjectively by the user. So, we prefer to perform extensive analytic and empirical analysis to investigate the consistency of results to the listed guidelines in Section III-B. Figure 5 shows the unit amounts P T (t) and P D (d) of exposure and the remaining quantities P T (t) and P D (d) of the location privacy at the temporal and spatial aspects. to the value of one minus the integral of the counterpart in Figure 5 (a) and Figure 5(b) , i.e. the calculated results in (9) and (10) . The underlying tendencies in Figure 5 are in accordance to the aforementioned guidelines, i.e., the successive quantitative accumulations are bound to trigger a qualitative change. The initial downtrend of P T (t) and P D (d) is gradually accelerating, corresponding to the increasing part of P T (t) and P D (d). When P T (t) and P D (d) reach their peak value, P T (t) and P D (d) are in the fastest decline phase, which means that the speed of location privacy exposure reaches the peak. After that, the downtrend of P T (t) and P D (d) slows down, corresponding to the decreasing part of P T (t) and P D (d). Figure 7 provides the relations of the whole remaining location privacy P(t, d) against the elapsed time t and distance d, which captures the fluctuation details of location privacy and makes the disclosure of location privacy more human-understandable. The remaining location privacy is gradually decreasing under the temporal and spatial influence.
In practice, the density of the observers' probes plays a key role for observers to track vehicles' movement. Due to cost and feasibility, the probes are not possibly arranged anywhere to cover the whole target area. Also the deployment situation of the observers' probes is invisible to the target connected vehicles. Thus the connected vehicles have to consider the worst case, where the observers' probes are ubiquitously available (i.e. ρ = 1), to quantify the disclosure of location privacy. Accordingly, the observers can only utilize the existing probes to collect the information for tracking the connected vehicles. Therefore, the exposure of location privacy from the users' view (termed by 'Theoretical Case') is worse than from the observers' perspective (termed by 'Real Case') except in the extreme case where the probes are everywhere available so the quantified value of location privacy by the user is equal to that by the observer.
We choose a simulation vehicular mobility dataset TAPASCologne [38] and a real vehicle trace dataset Roma-taxi [39] . The TAPASCologne dataset is composed of a 2-hour mobility trace (6am to 8am) of more than two hundred and fifty thousand cars with 1-second granularity and vehicle position on the 2D plane. The Roma-taxi dataset contains mobility traces of taxi cabs in Rome with GPS coordinates of approximately 320 taxis collected over 30 days. Figure 8 displays a demo for the deployed probes employed in the follow-up simulations. The probe density ρ could be calculated by the total coverage area of the probers divided by the concerned field. Figure 9 and Figure 10 provide the Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF) of the captured time window and distance length by the observers against various probe densities in the TAPASCologne dataset, in which one can know that a user is seldom full-journey tracked by the observers within the whole concerned window, even in the case of probes tangent to each other. Figure 11 shows the CCDF of the theoretical and real quantification of location privacy in the TAPASCologne dataset against various penetration rates of the observers' probes, in which one can know that the probe density ρ significantly affects the exposure of location privacy, i.e. the bigger the value ρ, the higher the population proportion over a given location-privacy exposure quantity. Figure 12 gives the average exposure of location privacyP(t, d) from users' and observers' viewpoints against various deployed ratios of the observers' probes in the Roma-taxi dataset, in which one can see that the location privacy decreases faster in the theoretical case than in the real case at initial, and gradually stabilizes to a value while the real case result continues to climb down. This is because the probe density ρ joins the calculation of location privacy in (13) in the theoretical case if the probe density ρ is known to the user while the probe density ρ does not explicitly contribute to the quantified value of location VOLUME 6, 2018 privacy in the real case. In fact, the stabilized values in the theoretical case approximate to one minus the corresponding probe density as the captured time t and distance d in (13) continue expanding, which is in accordance to the human perceptual intuition. Conclusively speaking, from the perspective of users, the probability of location-privacy exposure could be viewed as the possibility that one given point falls into the covered range of the observer's probes which was related to ρ. The higher the possibility of location-privacy exposure could be, the faster the location privacy exposure. In the real case, the disclosure of location privacy would occur upon the user entering the observed range, i.e. ρ ≡ 1, whatever the true value of ρ is from the observer's view, so the remaining location privacy tends to be empty. Figure 13 compares the location privacy change in the fixed lived-term pseudonym and adaptive lived-term pseudonym, in which one can know that the adaptive lived-term pseudonym could break the constraint of the predefined fixed time or space validity and tradeoff between the certificate-updating overhead and the location-privacy protection.
In summary, the unit amounts P T (t) and P D (d) of exposure and the remaining quantities P T (t) and P D (d) of the location privacy match that the successive quantitative accumulations are bound to trigger a qualitative change, i.e., the speed of location privacy exposure increases initially and reaches a peak, then gradually decreases. The bigger the subjectively customized thresholds T and D are, the slower the speed of location privacy exposure at the temporal and spatial aspects is. The remaining location privacy is gradually decreasing under the temporal and spatial influence, which is in accordance to the human perceptual intuition. Then by a simulation of TAPASCologne and Roma-taxi, we find that the probe density ρ significantly affects the exposure of location privacy, and that the remaining location privacy tends to be empty in the real case and to stabilized values in the theoretical case because the probe density ρ is known to the user. And the adaptive lived-term pseudonym could tradeoff between the certificate-updating overhead and the location-privacy protection.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyzed several quantification frameworks of location privacy, and proposed a theoretical framework from the spatio-temporal perspective in order to widen the research methodology in this area, which permits users to flexibly configure their preferential sensitivity extent. The presented quantification method facilitates to control the current location privacy to an anticipated level and thus balances between the location privacy protection and communication efficiency and service enjoyment. Our results show that the exposure of location privacy from the users' view is worse than that from the observers' except in the extreme case where the probes are everywhere available so the quantified values of location privacy by both are identical. From the users' perspective, the probability of location-privacy exposure could be viewed as the possibility that one given point falls into the covered range of the observer's probes.
Different from the enclosed Internet, connected vehicles behave more dynamically in a short time interval, during which a range of factors affecting communication, e.g. signal-noise ratio, traffic density, and potential probes, so privacy vary at the temporal and spatial scales. Thus, the future work will be mainly focused on how to jointly optimize cross-layer control for a trade-off between quality of service and privacy protection with the help of the presented quantitative location privacy in this paper. Another effort will be devoted to involving the discriminatory trajectory into the quantification of location privacy, which is a more complex problem. One potential way is to replace the Euclidean distance by the travelled distance between the origin and the current point to measure the spatial exposure of location privacy, which is an intuitionistic way to distinguish the trajectory importance. 
